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Systems and Controleess.SYIS-MM-symfne-oddn
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The exact three-player threshold for maximal multiplicity of feedback Nash equilibria in the symmetric scalar discounted linear-quadratic game

Abstract

Cavalagli, Bemporad and Zanon (IEEE Control Systems Letters textbf(10) (2026), 919–924) bound the number of hyperbolic feedback Nash equilibria of the symmetric N-player scalar discounted linear-quadratic game xₜ₊₁=axₜ+Σᵢ u_(i,t) and show that the maximal number 2^N-2 is attained when |a| ≥ (N-1)sqrtσ+√(σ+1/γ), a condition that is also necessary when N is even; for odd N their proof stops with the remark that obtaining a necessary condition would mean solving their inequality (21), "which cannot be done in closed-form". We settle the smallest odd case, N=3. In the aggregate coordinate g=(k+σ/k)/2 the relevant auxiliary function becomes a linear term plus a single square root, its minimisation over the negative axis reduces to the cubic (1-c)w³-3(1+c)w²+4(1+c)=0 with c=γσ, which has exactly one root bar w ∈ (1,2) for every c>0, and the threshold is a^(*)(σ,γ)=4sqrtσ/((2-bar w)√(1+bar w)). The maximal-multiplicity criterion of the source at N=3 holds if and only if agea^(*); equivalently, with the cubic root eliminated, if and only if X ≥ 5c+1 and (X+2-2c)³ ≥ 27(1+c)²X for X=γ a²; and a^(*)<2sqrtσ+√(σ+1/γ) strictly for all parameters, so the source's sufficient condition is never necessary at N=3. A root of the auxiliary function is shown to yield stable equilibria under the source's standing assumption, rational parameter points on both sides of the threshold are exhibited, and a missing factor γ in the quadratic the source displays just above its equation (13) is documented (equation (13) itself is unaffected). Every statement is verified in Lean 4 against Mathlib.

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    Source snapshot 2026-09-07 03:53 UTC

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Stated results

12 entries
SO1known2026-09-07

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SO2routine2026-09-07

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SO3routine2026-09-07

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SO4known2026-09-07

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SO5candidate2026-09-07

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SO6candidate2026-09-07

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SO7candidate2026-09-07

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SO8candidate2026-09-07

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SO9known2026-09-07

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SO10routine2026-09-07

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SO11candidate2026-09-07

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SO12correction2026-09-07

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Provenance

Generated by
Machina Mathematica
Released by
Korea Superintelligence Labs
Source context
The source, arXiv:2606.13087v1 (Cavalagli–Bemporad–Zanon, submitted 2026-06-11; still v1 on 2026-09-07), studies the scalar discrete-time N-player linear-quadratic game
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2026-09-07 03:53 UTC
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