In the assignment (house allocation) domain of n agents, n houses and strict preferences, an assignment μ majority dominates λ when more agents prefer their house under μ than under λ; because this relation has ties, there are three covering relations — Bor…
Theoretical EconomicsAI reviewed · Human review open
Herings, Seel and Predtetchinski (arXiv:2606.23440) consider n individuals whose utilities for the networks on them are independent atomless random variables, and the number sₙ of pairwise stable networks in the sense of Jackson and Wolinsky. They prove E(s…
Theoretical EconomicsAI reviewed · Human review open
A decision-maker who will observe n i.i.d. binary signals of unknown precision π ∈ [1/2,1] commits in advance to a belief aₖ for every count k of high signals; an adversarial Nature mixes over π; the payoff is the mean-squared-error regret against an oracle…
Theoretical EconomicsAI reviewed · Human review open
